Tuesday, September 1, 2009

Highlights of 40 years of Malta Libya relations

40 years of Malta Libya relations a brief overview.

By Dr. Alex Sceberras Trigona LL.D., M.A.(Oxon.) Former Foreign Minister of Malta and International Secretary, Malta Labour Party.

Instead of a historical narrative this is more of a personal assessment of the highlights in Malta Libya relations experienced in this period. An academic analysis of these relations still ought to be carried out focusing on the way prevailing and changing parameters of international relations affected Malta Libya relations between 1969 and 2009. It would therefore be useful to declare at the outset that this is an opening – a start – to establish the record both for the record as well as for future reference and action. More, many more testimonies are required from former Ministers, diplomats, entrepreneurs and workers. I therefore appeal to all those who have relevant information to bring it forward.

That academic analysis should focus on how the Cold War with all its ideological, strategic, political and economic divisions was the obvious, but not the only, prevailing parameter for the first 20 years. Whether the successive 20 years are more aptly packaged in Post-Cold War parameters or in a Unipolar system is a moot point. Another criterion would relate to the two countries' synchronization in full or otherwise of various dimensions of their foreign policies – for better or worse – during these 2 periods.

When Colonel Gaddaffi’s Revolution overthrew King Idris on the First of September, 1969, one of his primary objectives was to free Libya. Although Libya was independent since 1951 it was not completely 'free' because of the presence of foreign military bases on its territory. This echoed similar objectives strongly espoused by a large number of other states made recently independent more in name than in substance. The enormous pull of Nasser’s successful model on a number of these states was telling, especially on nearby Libya and Malta. After the 1956 Suez debacle however, where the British-French-Israeli attack ground to a humiliating halt because of President Eisenhower’s opposition, the enhanced lure of Nasser’s model became irresistible.

Dom Mintoff, already PM between 1955-1958 when foreign affairs and defence matters were strictly ‘Reserved Matters’ i.e. reserved to the British colonial power, had met Nasser in 1959. He had strongly criticized Malta's 1964 Independence Constitution as a mockery of true independence – even a farce - because of the retention of a substantial amount of military bases on the islands by the British. No wonder then that on his first visit to Gaddaffi whilst still Leader of the Opposition with Paul Xuereb, later President of the Republic of Malta, and Salvu Sant, later President of the Party, in February 1971 Mintoff found not only words of comfort from his host but an understanding partner actively set on assisting him in all possible ways in closing Malta’s foreign military bases[1]. He was even ready to support him whether through underwriting or financing once in government to achieve this goal as he indeed did in a most timely and crucially significant manner.

On the first visit of Colonel Gaddafi to Malta on the 25-26th November 1973 immediately after the October Yom Kippur war when President Sadat’s simultaneous use of the ‘oil weapon’ against the West turned the lights out in Europe but also threatened to bring to a halt Malta’s industry, economy and Mintoff’s quest for freedom altogether as we did not have a strategic energy reserve of our own yet, the provision of petroleum at favourable prices was promised by Gaddaffi in bilateral talks with Mintoff. He was met at the airport by Governor-General Sir Anthony Mamo and Prime Minister Dom Mintoff. Wherever he went, President Gaddafi was cheered by the crowds, many of these having gathered spontaneously. During his short stay Gaddafi visited the Malta Drydocks, Gnien Gaddafi, the Hypogeum, the Moslem Cemetery and toured over Gozo by a helicopter specially brought over from Tripoli.

What if Mintoff had not found this partner? Would he have sought closure anyway? It might have arguably been all the more difficult – if not impossible – for Mintoff elected PM again in June 1971 to negotiate the closure of the British/NATO military bases in Malta without this steadfast support from Libya. That consistent support remained most relevant throughout the 7 year period until final closure on the 31st March 1979 when, as agreed in the 1972 Anglo-Maltese Agreement, the last British troops withdrew from Malta after 179 years. The large number of bilateral co-operation treaties[2] signed and implemented in this period between Libya and Malta demonstrate that this was the highest historical period of closest collaboration.

It was the first time that the two countries were so close together on foreign policy not because outside rulers ordered this but because their own national leaders willed it so. It was not so until then. Historically, Malta as well as the port of Tripoli [which was quickly lost to the Turks] had both been granted together in perpetual fiefdom in 1530 to the Order of the Knights of St. John by Charles V of Spain, as King of Sicily, for purely strategic anti-Ottoman reasons, not because any local leaders so desired.

During the Second World War (WWII) British attacks from Malta constantly interrupted Rommel’s already stretched supply lines and thus helped Montgomery’s 8th Army tremendously in routing Rommel and in liberating Libya both from Italian colonialism and the Fascist yoke. Meanwhile Malta’s Nationalist leaders, well known for their ardent pro-Italian sympathies, had established such intimate connections with Mussolini who even gave considerable financial support to their party whilst trumpeting ‘irredentist’ claims on Malta, that a number of them had to be interned in Uganda by the British on the outbreak of the war. So this wartime closeness was less a local-to-local combination and much more of a joint effort between a few local and mainly foreign leaders. Even after WWII, Libya and Malta remained linked together when Britain still held bases and troops in both Malta and Libya after Independence.

I recall an old gilt-edged invitation by the British G.O.C. showing his HQ’s address in the old Knights’ Auberge de Castille HQ as General Officer Commanding [both] Malta and Libya; Mintoff as PM again in 1971 kept this on display in his office in Castille for a number of years after closure of the bases. He was after all the first Maltese leader to rule the Islands from that historic Auberge!

Gaddaffi had immediately abolished the monarchy on the 1st of September, 1969. Malta’s Independence Constitution had also retained the Queen Elizabeth II as Queen of Malta!!! Mintoff abolished the British Monarch from being also Malta’s Monarch with massive support in Parliament for the new Republican 1974 Constitution. Only 6 Nationalist MPs voted against. Sir Anthony Mamo who as Crown Advocate General had travelled with Mintoff as PM to Libya in the fifties was made the first President of the newly established Republic of Malta. Gaddafi was the first Head of State to visit Malta from the 19th till the 21st December 1974 just one week after Malta became a Republic.

During his stay Col Gaddafi met Prime Minister Mintoff at Castille and discussed amongst other subjects petroleum and the Kalafrana port project. During this second visit of his he also signed an agreement setting up a Libyan-Maltese Holding Company to promote Libyan investment in industry and tourism in Malta. Gaddafi paid visits to the General Workers Union and visited the Polytechnic where he addressed the students, and the Malta Drydocks where he inspected progress on work on the floating dock being constructed there for Libya. Gaddafi also made a speech in the Maltese House of Representatives. Gaddafi also inaugurated the Libyan Cultural Institute sited symobolically instead of the British Main Guard in the main square of Valletta just opposite the President’s Palace and Parliament.

On his third visit to Malta between the 22nd and 23rd May, 1976, Col Gaddafi again addressed Polytechnic students and publicly promised to help Malta get rid of all military bases. He attended an MLP Mass Rally at Cospicua and met the Cabinet at Castille. The highlight of this visit was the award of Malta’s highest honorary award, the “Gieh ir-Repubblika”, to Col Gaddafi by the President of the Republic Sir Anthony Mamo. The ceremony was boycotted by the Nationalist Party, indeed no shadow Ministers or MPs from that party were present. During a press conference Colonel Gaddafi stated that Libya would not assist Malta if it joined an alliance such as NATO.

During his fourth visit to Malta between the 1st and 3rd July, 1978, Colonel Gaddafi attended an MLP Mass Meeting at Birzebbugia where he assured Malta of support in case of aggression. He also laid the foundation stone of the Paola Mosque and Islamic Centre, and visited Gozo for the first time.

In its Proclamation of the 1st of September 1969 the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) had declared that it would proceed, with the help of God, "in the path of Freedom, Unity, and Social Justice”. The rule of the Turks and Italians and the "reactionary" regime just overthrown were characterized as belonging to "dark ages," from which the Libyan people were called to move forward as "free brothers" to a new age of prosperity, equality, and honour.

‘Freedom’ in the sense of freedom from foreign military bases then was a unifying strand in Maltese Libyan relations at least until 1979. This common even ideological understanding of freedom took us quite far together. However, agreeing on ‘Freedom from …’ did not also mean agreeing on ‘Freedom to …’. Mintoff had originally declared in March 1972 that he had sought a 7 year base agreement in order to free Malta from its economic dependence on having to lease out military bases.

Come 1979 – he promised quite threateningly - a truly economically viable and free Malta could autonomously decide whether to grant military bases to whosoever it chose on ideological grounds and not because of economic necessity. This notwithstanding he strove relentlessly on from 1972 to attain an internationally recognized status of Neutrality for Malta to be adopted immediately after the bases’ closure. The Europeans required to be coaxed even in writing by President Jimmy Carter to accept this proposal.

Colonel Gaddafi visited Malta for the 31st March 1979 celebrations on the closure of the British/NATO military bases. He addressed the public at the recently restored Mediterranean Conference Centre, where he assured the crowds gathered there of continued Libyan financial assistance to Malta and he also promised to urge other Arab states to extend further their assistance to Malta. Amongst the more prominent countries to express their support in international declarations or agreements were:- Yugoslavia and Algeria which both signed Declarations of Welcome, Recognition and Support of Malta’s Neutrality immediately on the bases’ closure in 1979; Italy signed the Neutrality Agreement and a corresponding Financial Protocol with Malta on the 15th September 1980; the Soviet Union welcomed, recognized and supported Malta’s Neutrality in an Agreement signed on the 8th of October 1981; France’s Declaration of Welcome, Recognition and Support of Malta’s Neutrality came in December 1981; President Ronald Reagan’s Declaration of recognition and support came in June 1982. Colonel Gaddaffi and Mintoff signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in November 1984 recognizing Malta’s Neutrality together with a Protocol on Security signed by Ali Treiki and myself[3].

‘Freedom to …’ also meant, amongst other things, to free others. This was understood in different measures in Malta and Libya. Libya’s actions of actively supporting as many liberation movements’ struggles worldwide did not find an ally in the Maltese Government although Mintoff’s was the first European Government to give the PLO an Embassy in Malta and full diplomatic recognition and privileges in 1973 together with substantial humanitarian and educational support.

Similarly, regarding Libya’s attachment to the RCC’s 2nd objective namely, “Pan-Arab Unity”, whilst Malta supported this in principle it was not as attached to it as Col. Gaddaffi was, until decades of frustration turned his attention to the African Union which he now Chairs. Malta was only interested then in having a healthy and functional relationship with the Arab League as an organization and with its members bilaterally. Libya’s aims of uniting all the Arabs through various mergers either with Syria or Egypt since 1970 or others, remained its own affair as did “The Steadfastness and Confrontation Front”.[4] Nevertheless, whilst an Israeli Embassy was retained in Malta by the Labour Government, the Malta Labour Party did its utmost especially through its membership of the Socialist International to seek to bridge differences between the PLO and the Israeli Labour Party even organizing - especially under the Chairmanship of former German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Secretary Bernt Carlsson - meetings where representatives from both sides could meet although on one occasion in Portugal the Palestinian representative [Issam Sartawi] was shot before our very eyes.

A recurring theme of bilateral disagreement throughout the 70s was the question of the delimitation of the delimitation of the Continental Shelf. Through the wise intervention of the Chancellor of Austria Bruno Kreisky, Colonel Gaddaffi flew to Malta from Vienna on the 13th March 1982 and agreed to refer the matter of the Continental Shelf to the International Court of Justice [ICJ] in The Hague and an agreement to this effect was signed by Foreign Minister Abdul Ati El Obeidi and myself[5]. The two sides also accepted the ICJ judgement and this agreement signed by Minister Hassan Abdulati El Barghati and myself on the 10th November 1986 was later ratified by our Parliament as Act III of 1987, now recorded as Chapter 316 of the Laws of Malta. What remains so amazing 22 years later is that the legal certainty imparted by the ICJ judgement to the delimitation of the Continental Shelf has not been sufficiently exploited since by the PN Government with any oil production activity whatever in the rich zone delimited to Malta; nor has the PN concluded, as promised, any extension westwards or eastwards of the ICJ determined delimitation line.

We found strong common ground elsewhere however, especially in our passionate commitment to launch and establish Co-operation and Security in the Mediterranean. Our Mediterranean policy was well articulated both at Party as well as at Governmental level. At Party level the holding of Conferences of Socialist and Progressive Parties of the Mediterranean had started in 1976 in Barcelona. This was done in conjunction with the Spanish Socialist Party [PSOE] just revived with great assistance from the Socialist International, although Spain was still under Franco’s fascist regime. Meeting then in Malta in 1977, and in 1978 in Athens, which was also just emerging from long years of the fascist Colonels’ dictatorship with the also just revived Panhellenic Socialist Party [pasok], a truly Mediterranean political process was launched for the first time. More Conferences were held later in Rome, Tripoli, Algiers, Lisbon and Paris transforming this process into a standing Conference which grew into a movement led by its Secretary General, the late Libyan Ahmed Shahati. Socialist Youth Organizations of the Mediterranean were also convened in these capitals.

This series of meetings afforded a number of Mediterranean Socialist Party leaders and cadres ample opportunities for meeting, exchanging views and information beyond what was purveyed in the media and to discuss and prepare policies for when in government. Solidarity was also publicly expressed with member parties during their election campaigns. Apart from the persuasive media influence generated by these Conferences and ancillary meetings, perhaps it was the informal familiarity with each other which these meetings permitted which would serve future Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers so well once in government: that was their lasting value. That we got to know not only Craxi, Gonzalez, Mitterand, Papandreou and Soares amongst others as Opposition Leaders so well before they got into government served our bilateral relations and future Mediterranean initiatives in the 70s and 80s enormously.

At the governmental level, Mintoff had already started by convening in Malta in 1972 the Quadripartite Talks with Italy, Libya and Tunisia to explore ways and means of carrying out Mediterranean projects. Mintoff articulated his well supported Mediterranean policy best in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in the 70s and 80s much before the Barcelona process was launched in 1995.

First of all by 1973 in Dipoli, Finland he had ensured that in addition to the 35 European states together with the USA and Canada all Mediterranean riparian states should thenceforth be invited to make their contributions. Libyan diplomats took the floor on a number of occasions thereafter thanks to Mintoff’s initiative. Then in a classic use of the consensus rule he introduced a whole Mediterranean Chapter to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 which should still be essential reading for anyone who is sincerely interested in Mediterranean affairs.

This was followed up by the First Experts Meeting on the Mediterranean held at the newly restored Mediterranean Conference Centre in Valletta for seven whole weeks on the eve of the historic 31st March, 1979. Various projects for political, economic and cultural co-operation were submitted and considered there as they would be in subsequent Mediterranean meetings afterwards. By the time of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe being held in Stockholm in the early eighties we were also advancing proposals for naval disarmament in the Mediterranean as contemplated in the Helsinki Final Act.

Then in the Madrid CSCE Conference recourse was had again to the consensus rule to obtain a mandate to organize the first meeting in Malta in 1984 of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned countries of the Mediterranean[6] (FMs of the NAM) countries which was to report its conclusions to the CSCE. We had also attained within the Neutrals and Non-Aligned Group (N+N)[7] in the CSCE a mandate to report the outcome of CSCE meetings to the Non-Aligned Group which I and other N+Ns carried out regularly. It is to be noted that on the basis of another Maltese initiative at the Non-aligned Summit of Heads of State or Government held in Delhi, India in 1983 I had already obtained a mandate to organize in Valletta the first Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned countries of the Mediterranean. This convergence of our diplomatic initiatives manifested our Mediterranean credentials in as many international fora as possible for nearly two decades. This was also a most pragmatic foreign policy.

One most relevant conclusion here of the First Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries of the Mediterranean in Valletta, 1984,[8] now set up as a process, was its unanimous Appeal to the riparian States of the North of the Mediterranean which was in effect a Mediterranean Non-Aggression Pact in the making. In essence it held the following:- On the understanding that none of the Northern riparian States would allow their territories [including bases on their territories] to be used for acts of aggression against the Southern riparian States, these Southern riparian States would reciprocally not allow their territories to be used for acts of aggression against the Northern riparian States.

This became most relevant in the beginning of 1986 when US air-force units had already engaged Libyan units over the Gulf of Sirte in January. When the situation escalated to a threat of US use of force against the Libyan mainland in the beginning of April we had taken four initiatives. First I had called an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, with great difficulty it being a Saturday because of a “threat to peace” when it did indeed meet to consider our appeal for peace in our region to be maintained and that any disputes were better solved as the UN Charter provided namely by peaceful settlement.

The US’s threat to use force went against the Charter and threatened not only Libya but the region as a whole as our Ambassador the late George Agius ably argued in the UNSC. The debate which opened on Saturday resumed on Monday when we termed the threat as having become “an imminent threat to peace”. It is a sad story of the UN’s limited powers in not stopping the notified aggression that Monday to Tuesday night – an act of aggression taking place even when as the jargon has it “the UNSC is seized of the dispute” even that is during the discussion on the dispute - flouting this highest institution dedicated to peace and global security.

Secondly, on Monday evening the PM of Libya Jadallah Azouz At-Talhi accepted our suggestion to come to Malta to meet the US Ambassador who had promised to meet him here for an eleventh hour attempt by us to save the day through direct bilateral talks. When he came to Castille and met PM Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, Mintoff and myself however we kept on waiting for the US Ambassador who did not turn up.

Third, I had from the previous week started reminding one by one the Governments of Greece, Italy, France and Spain of the NAM Appeal not to allow their territories to be used in acts of aggression against southern mediterranean states or else these would no longer be bound by the non-aggression commitment. Greece led by PM Papandreou immediately responded that no bases were going to be used in such an attack. Spain under PM Gonzalez too was quite prompt to respond in a similar positive fashion. France under Mitterand retorted that there were no bases on its territory and, anyway, it was not participating in this attack. Italy’s Andreotti as FM too joined in and responded positively[9].

It has been held that as a consequence of this diplomatic initiative the attack became more difficult and complex. It had to depart from UK bases instead of the US’s Mediterranean bases in Greece, Italy or Spain. This stretched fuel supplies and fuelling had to be carried out quite dangerously in those days in mid-air. It took longer coming down the Atlantic from the UK to Gibraltar without overflying Spain or France to enter the Mediterranean. It also became sufficiently exposed along a longer route especially in the Mediterranean to be noticed.

Fourth, as soon as Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici was informed of so many unidentified and unauthorised aircraft approaching our region he immediately gave Libya the alert - one whole hour ahead of the air-strike hitting the target, thus possibly saving Gaddaffi’s life, though not unfortunately his daughter’s or other innocent victims’ lives.[10] Apart from customary international rules of good-neighbourly relations our [now abolished] Libyan-Maltese Security Protocol[11] bound us to inform each the other of any threat to our security or defence.

Fifth, following the shooting of a missile over Lampedusa in April 1986 prompted Italy to suspend diplomatic relations with Libya. It was through our good offices that the two countries got back on track in a matter of seven months after the incident when I managed to get the two countries’ Foreign Ministers Andreotti and Maghour to meet together in Malta’s Foreign Ministry.

Co-ordinating our Mediterranean and foreign policies from now on would involve working closely also with the secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation [GPC] which since March 2009 has this mandate with an explicit reference to the Mediterranean once again, although it emphasizes the African dimension more than the Arab one:-

- "The GPC stresses the importance of reviving the role of the Great Jamahiriyah in the Mediterranean region and its effective participation in all the region's activities. It calls for the need to make the Great Jamahiriyah a bridge for cultural contacts between Africa and Europe, to coordinate stances with the Western Mediterranean states - five + five dialogue - to expand its membership to include Egypt and Greece and to establish relations based on mutual respect and common interests among the group's states. The GPC strongly opposes the Union for the Mediterranean project, which was born dead. It is a new version to exert domination."

- The GPC also calls for the need to make Africa, the Mediterranean region and the Middle East "a region free from weapons of mass destruction and from foreign military bases and fleets. It calls for the right of all states to benefit from nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

- "The GPC stresses, once again, the need to follow up the call by the Great Jamahiriyah to reform the UN in a way to improve the performance of and to democratize this organization". It also called for the abolition of the Veto within the Security Council and to expanding its membership.

The other foreign policy element in the GPC’s mandate last March has just been accomplished: "The GPC, once again, maintains that Libyan citizen and political hostage Abd-al-Basit al-Miqrahi is innocent and entrusts the secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation to continue efforts for his release." The release of Abd-al-Basit al-Miqrahi on the 20th August, 2009 completes the thawing of Libya’s frozen international relations – frozen for nearly 2 decades because of Lockerbie, although the negative effects on Malta’s reputation have not yet been cleared[12]. These two decades could easily be termed as frozen, lost or nameless decades insofar as Libya’s international relations are concerned. The future for enhanced bilateral and multilateral co-operation beckons now.

We have already had fruitful talks in Libya in this regard with H.E. Suleiman Shahoumi, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the GPC last October, 2008, when Party Leader Dr. Joseph Muscat and I visited Tripoli. We set up two Committees one on Energy and Economic affairs, the other on Political Affairs. A delegation led by Ambassador Mohammed El-Badri participated in our activities celebrating the 30th anniversary of the closure of all British/NATO military bases here last March when our Committees started their work. This visit of H.E. Suleiman Shahoumi, Foreign Secretary of the GPC together with his distinguished delegation to participate in this review of the last 40 years gives us further courage that our bilateral relations can be rekindled.

In summary, I have tried to sketch out elements of what could easily be called the “GOLDEN AGE” of Malta Libya relations. The strong commonality of fundamental views shared between Gaddaffi and Mintoff was really the heart of the matter. They essentially agreed that their countries’ true freedom was to be achieved through the closure of foreign military bases which they succeeded in accomplishing. This bonded Libya and Malta even more together as the application of the 1984 Security Protocol demonstrated so well when needed during the air-strike in April of 1986.

The RCC’s 3rd objective of “social justice” was also deeply shared by Mintoff who successfully pressed on Gaddaffi the international or at least the bilateral meaning of this noble goal. Libya’s consistent support for Malta during the Golden Age by providing oil at favourable prices in an international market that had seen oil prices rocketing 10, 20 even 30 times higher in a few weeks was greatly appreciated by most Maltese whose electricity bills were never alarming or exhorbitant in those days. It did enable Mintoff not to have to increase taxes to pay for the oil-price increase and it also helped him to introduce domestic measures of social justice in the housing, health, education and welfare spheres with greater ease.

In the difficult transition period 1972-1979 when the military bases were gradually being closed down piece by piece also to stagger and thus buffer the unemployment impact on the economy, alternative employment in Libya for Maltese reached a plateau of around 7,000 which in effect constituted by sheer numbers and pay the biggest buffer indeed. Continuous exchanges of views between the relevant Ministers on both sides smoothed out numerous administrative problems like national insurance contributions, pension rights, industrial relations and terms and conditions of work as shown by the varied range of international treaties concluded then in this regard. But the higher the Maltese workers’ pay packets got and the better the terms of holidays and work got the easier it was for the Far Eastern workers to undercut them as started happening by the early eighties also hastened by the increasing recession.

In parallel to this welcome boon for employment a series of longer term measures aimed at creating alternative jobs from the military bases were launched. Mintoff’s Labour Government was constantly seeking to attract foreign direct investment aimed mainly at job creation. Pressing the Libyans in this regard was natural and Libya was extremely forthcoming. Dr. Noel Zarb Adami will tell you more about Libyan investment in Malta in heavy and numerous light industries and hotels and hotel complexes and their employment absorption effect. Other measures taken by Libya which also helped job creation were for example the Fishing Agreements which attracted youngsters to enter the trade because of free and unhindered access to the lush untapped huge fishing zones on the very long coastline of 1700km. whilst also attracting a number of foreign partners with modern technology. The Banking Agreement also enabled jobs not to be lost and in fact increased by easing the strain on payments [as explained above in footnote five] making Maltese exporters or service providers thus more competitive than their European counterparts.

On the initiative of PM Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, the freedom of movement of peoples between the two countries was enormously enhanced during the international recession of the time, by allowing all movement to be not only visa-free but merely on the basis of identity cards or car licences. Thus Libyan entrepreneurs found it easier to travel to Malta on the day they so desired if only to effect some changes in their portfolio at the BOVI, or to holiday here with their families being Malta’s highest rated shoppers, or for Board of Directors meetings of Companies which Libyans increasingly registered here.

This “GOLDEN AGE” in our bilateral relations is no more. There is no doubt about this. There is no special relationship between us anymore. Many contributed to construct that Golden Age in roughly the first 20 of the last 40 years. Many more contributed to destroy that Golden Age in roughly the last 20 years.

What history teaches us is that up to now it was the exception and not the rule that our two peoples had phenomenal leaders who easily understood each other on fundamentals and promptly found so many areas of mutually beneficial agreement for their peoples.

The question therefore is not, “Can we nostalgically just reverse and go back to the GOLDEN AGE?”

Instead, we should be more pragmatically asking ourselves the following questions:-

1. Can we start working for greater understanding between our two peoples?

2. Can we start working on how to improve bilateral relations which are at an all-time low?

3. Can we start identifying, designing and implementing elements of a New Strategic Relationship with the objectives of Freedom and Social Justice bilaterally and in the Mediterranean?

Yes, we can!

Though a cliché now, this is really the obvious and the only answer! Let us start working together towards these ends.

We made it then!

Let’s make it again!

25/08/2009



[1] In its foreign policy from 1951 newly independent Libya maintained a pro-Western stance and was recognized as belonging to the conservative traditionalist bloc in the League of Arab States (Arab League), of which it became a member in 1953. The same year Libya concluded a twenty-year treaty of friendship and alliance with Britain under which the latter received military bases in exchange for financial and military assistance. The next year, Libya and the United States signed an agreement under which the United States also obtained military base rights, subject to renewal in 1970, in return for economic aid to Libya. Reservations set aside in the desert were used by British and American military aircraft based in Europe as practice firing ranges. From the 1st of September 1969 an early objective of the new revolutionary government was withdrawal of all foreign military installations from Libya. Following negotiations, British military bases at Tobruk and nearby El Adem closed in March 1970, and U.S. facilities at Wheelus Air Force Base near Tripoli (hosting more than 6, 000 troops at any one time) and which had an air-borne nuclear strike capability in place by 1956) were all closed in June 1970.

[2] Foremost among which and listed in the Friendship Treaty of 1984 were the following:-

Loan agreement signed in Tripoli, August 1971; Entry and exit visas agreement signed in Valletta on the 9th July 1972; Cultural Agreement signed in Tripoli on the 5th October 1972; Agreement on the Participation of Maltese contracting Companies in the execution of housing projects in Libya signed in Tripoli on the 5th October 1972; Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income signed in Tripoli on 5th October 1972; Agreement for the encouragement of the movement of Capital for Investment signed in Valletta on the 8th February 1973; Agreement to supply Malta with refined/crude oil signed in Tripoli on 28 April, 1975; Agreement for the establishment of a Holding Company signed in Tripoli on the 19th May 1975; Agreement on broadcasting signed in Valletta on 20 June 1975; Loan agreement signed in Valletta on 29 July 1975; Special Agreement for the submission to the International Court of Justice of Difference signed in Valletta on the 23rd May 1976; Manpower Agreement signed in Tripoli on the 27th May 1978; Agreement for the establishment of a Maltese/Libyan fishing company signed in Tripoli on the 17th July 1978;

These were followed after 1979 by:- Co-operation Agreement signed in Valletta on the 10th August 1984 and its amendments of 24th September 1985 and 30th March 1988; Co-operation Agreement between Telemalta Corporation and the Libyan Jamahiriya Broadcasting signed in Valletta on the 19th August 1984; Trade Agreement signed in Tripoli on the 19th December 1984; Agreement for regulating scheduled air services between and beyond their respective territories signed in Tripoli on the 15th January 1985; Agreement on Co-operation signed in Valletta on the 5th November 1985; Agreement implementing Article III of the Special Agreement and the Judgement of the ICJ signed in Valletta on the 10th November 1986; Agreement on Social Security signed in Valletta on the 6th May 1988; Agreement on the setting up of a joint venture company to operate and run supermarkets at the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya signed in Valletta on the 28th October 1988.

It is still amazing to understand how a nationalist government abolished so many of these including the innocuous but lucrative Fishing Agreement in the early 90s under outside pressure. This had given Malta flagged fishing boats unrestricted access to the rich fishing zones stretching for 1700 km off Libya’s coastline.

[3] Ratified by Malta’s Parliament on the 7th December, 1984 by ACT XXII of 1984 as Chapter 311 of the Laws of Malta, but substantially amended by Act XXIII of 1990 so as to abolish the Security Protocol.

[4] This was formed in 1977 by the governments of Libya, Algeria, Syria, and South Yemen as well as by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It was intended as a protest and a show of position following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, after President Anwar Sadat of Egypt had travelled to Tel-Aviv to meet Israeli PM Menachem Begin in peace negotiations that would eventually lead to the Camp David Accords. This Egyptian initiative was widely seen in the Arab world as an abandonment of agreed-upon principles of non-recognition of Israel, and as breaking the Arab alliance against Israel. It was generally condemned as treachery for being a separate and not a comprehensive peace.

[5] Foreign Minister Abdul Ati el Obeidi and I also concluded a seminal Banking Agreement whereby our two Central Banks would regularly clear payments for goods and services exported or provided to Libya by Maltese companies and entrepreneurs against our payments for oil received. This enabled these Maltese companies and entrepreneurs to be paid instantly on presentation of their Letters of Credit to the Central Bank of Malta. It helped them overcome the very long and extremely costly and unnerving delays involved in securing payments in Libya. Our agreement was eyed so enviously by other countries’ companies and entrepreneurs that it is quite amazing that the present government gave this up too under outside pressure.

[6] Foreign Ministers from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Cyprus, Syria, Yugoslavia and the PLO all attended and participated actively at this meeting.

[7] Composed of Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, San Marino, Malta and Cyprus.

[8] The Second meeting of FMs of the NAM was held at Brioni, Yugoslavia, in 1987. The Third Meeting of FMs of the NAM was held in Algiers, Algeria in 1990.

[9] Libya’s former Foreign Minister Abdel Rahman Shalgam reported that the Italians informed him personally a day before that there would be an American aggression against Libya, since, at the time, he was Libya’s Ambassador in Rome.

[10] It is interesting to note that in last year’s Compensation Agreement signed by David David Welch, US assistant secretary of state and Ahmed al-Fatroui, head of America affairs, in Libya's foreign ministry, “Libya will fully compensate victims of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, and of the bombing of a Berlin disco two years earlier. In its turn, the US will compensate victims of attacks on the Libyan capital, Tripoli, and Benghazi in 1986”. This was how it was reported by the BBC on the 14th August, 2008 at 14.47hrs, but in a later report on the same day, at 21.27hrs, the BBC intriguingly reported that “The agreement will fully compensate victims of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, and of the bombing of a Berlin disco two years earlier. It will also address Libyan claims arising from US attacks on the Libyan capital, Tripoli, and Benghazi in 1986”

[11] Article 1: “….. the two sides agree that there should be a continuous exchange of information on matters of special interest to the mutual security and defence purposes of the other side;”

[12] At least one feasible possibility for clearing Malta’s name completely exists through an immediate call for a United Nations Inquiry into the death of its own UN Commissioner for Namibia, Bernt Carlsson, in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. He was well known to us in the Malta Labour Party having visited us on a number of occasions as Secretary General of the Socialist International.